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The Taxation of Ideology
WILLIAM J. LEHRFELD*
This article is principally about tax exempt organizations, with emphasis on
the historical treatment of organizations engaged in ardent (and, in the case
of the Communist Party, sometimes illegal) causes. Its purpose is to put into
perspective the reactions of the processes of government which foster or
hinder these causes through interpretation and enforcement of various pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code. The Code grants income tax exemption
to a wide variety of public and private nonprofit organizations.1 Some
organizations serve only the purposes of their members and receive only in-
come tax exemption while others, having a greater commitment to public
service, receive additional benefits. Thus, privately controlled mutual or-
ganizations, such as country clubs and credit unions, pay no federal income
tax on their earnings. 2 Educational, charitable, religious and like organ-
izations are not only exempt from income tax, but are eligible to receive
gifts and bequests which are deductible by their donors when they compute
their income, gift or estate taxes. 3 In addition, such organizations are not
liable for social security and employment taxes.
4
Organizations with causes to propagate seek the expanded benefits of
the "educational" or "charitable" classification to promote donations and an
improved financial condition. Initial contact of any claimant seeking the
preferred status is through the application and private rulings process ad-
ministered by the Internal Revenue Service. Under long-standing regula-
tions, all claimants of exempt status, regardless of classification, are advised
that before exemption (and, for some, deductible status) is established,
the organization must demonstrate that its purposes and activities comport
with the statutory requirements. 5 If the organization makes a proper show-
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.S., Lehigh University, 1958; LL.B.,
Catholic University of America, 1965.
1. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501.
2. Id. § 501(c)(7), (14)(A).
3. Id. §§ 170, 2522, 2055.
4. Id. §§ 3121(b)(8)(B), 3306(c)(8).
5. Compare Regulations 33, revised, Art. 67, T.D. 2690, 20 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV.
127, 172-73 (1918) with Treas. Reg. § 1-501(a)-l(a) (1958).
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ing, it will receive a private letter ruling recognizing the exempt status. If
it fails to meet the tests prescribed, the organization is advised of the
Service's contrary opinion and advised of its appeal rights, both adminis-
trative and judicial. Some organizations which claim "educational" or
"charitable" status may be denied recognition under that classification and
granted exemption as a "social welfare" organization or "civic league,"6 a
status which is not eligible for tax deductible contributions. Even though
an organization qualified through the private rulings process for tax exempt
status, the Revenue Service may revoke the private ruling for lack of con-
tinued conformity to the provisions governing exemption. 7 Revocation of the
ruling may be either prospective or retroactive, depending upon the cir-
cumstances.
The Tax Act of 1894,8 the predecessor of the present-day Internal Reve-
nue Code, contained exemptions for
corporations, companies, or associations organized and con-
ducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes,
including fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations
operating [under] the lodge system and providing for the payment
of life, sick, accident, and other benefits to the members of such so-
cieties, orders, or associations and dependents of such members.0
Following the invalidation of the 1894 Act by the Supreme Court 0 the
Excise Tax Act of 1909, as a corporate excise tax, again provided or-
ganizational exemptions from the modest tax imposed upon corporate busi-
ness enterprises." Ratification of the 16th amendment brought the 1913 In-
come Tax Act,' 2 and the exemptions for nonprofit organizations accorded
under the 1913 Act were simply carried over from the 1909 Act. 13  The
1913 Act precipitated a flood of taxpayer queries, and apparently the In-
ternal Revenue Bureau attempted to answer all questions.' 4 Almost as soon
as the exemption provisions were added to the tax laws, administrative
6. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501(c)(4).
7. Rev. Proc. 69-3, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 16, 18.
8. Ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509.
9. Id. at 556.
10. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing, 158
U.S. 601 (1895).
11. Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112-17.
12. Ch. 16, § 2, 38 Stat. 166.
13. See Eliasberg, Charity and Commerce: Section 501(c)(3)-How Much Unre-
lated Business Activity? 21 TAX L. REV. 53, 55 (1965). Most of the debate on the
terms or phrases used to describe the classes of exempt organizations occurred during
the Senate debate on the 1909 Act. See, e.g., 44 CONG. REC. 4148-49 (1909).
14. See Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A State-
ment of Principles, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAXATION 1 (1962).
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judgments were being rendered on problems posed by politics and ideology
in a tax exempt setting.15
Evidently in response to internal rulings problems, regulations which first
attempted to define "education" introduced the concept of "controversial
or partisan propaganda," the dissemination of which would not entitle an
organization to educational status.'"  Organizations were advised that:
"associations formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda
are not educational within the meaning of the statute."' 7  No counterpart
of such a standard was promulgated for delimiting charitable, literary or
religious purposes, but as the case law developed, the standard was extended
to all such classifications. The Bureau readily admitted that the educational
standard was broader than the teacher-pupil relationship, 8 and even per-
mitted economic interests to color the judgment of the educator.' 9 In ampli-
fying its regulation, the Bureau's Solicitor sought to distinguish organizations
which were partisan on noncontroversial issues, deemed allowable, and those
whose advocacy on one side of an issue involved some public controversy:
The prime purpose of education is to benefit the individual ....
It is a matter of common knowledge that propaganda in the pop-
ular sense is disseminated not primarily to benefit the individual at
whom it is directed, but to accomplish the purpose or purposes of
the person instigating it.
20
Application of such an ingenuous standard permitted allowance of exemp-
tion to advocates of prevailing opinions and denial of exemption to dissenters.
The rule of overdog was prevalent. Allowance of educational status to
those who argued for protectionism 21 and national defense 22 seemed to
represent the early policy of the Bureau. 23  An unpopular group, such
as the American Association for Labor Reform, arguing for better and
fairer legislative standards for labor, was deemed a propaganda outlet.24
15. Cf. H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL TAXES § 117 (1919), with specific ref-
erence to T.D. 2090, 16 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 259 (1914).
16. Regulations 45, § 517, T.D. 3146, 23 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 352, 490 (1921).
17. Id. The sentence quoted in the text appeared without substantial change in Ar-
ticle 517 of Regulations 62, T.D. 3295, 24 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 207, 360-61 (1922),
Regulations 65, T.D. 3640, 26 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 745, 896-97 (1924), and Regula-
tions 69, T.D. 3922, 28 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 558, 715-16 (1926); and then in Article
527 of Regulations 74 and 77 and Article 101(6)-i of Regulations 86 and 94. Query:
Did the Bureau believe there could be noncontroversial or nonpartisan propaganda?
18. See S. 1176, 1 CUM. BULL. 147, 148 (1919).
19. I.T. 1882, 11-2 CUM. BULL. 201 (1923) (allowing a bar association to qualify as
educational). But see G.C.M. 4805, VII-2 CUM. BULL. 58 (1928).
20. S. 1362, 2 CUM. BULL. 152, 154 (1920).
21. S. 455, Aug. 28, 1918 (unpublished).
22. S. 992, 1 CUM. BULL. 145 (1919).
23. But see O.D. 44, 1 CuM. BULL. 150 (1919).
24. S. 1362, 2 CUM. BULL. 152 (1920). This published ruling is evidently based
on an unfavorable private ruling issued to the American Association for Labor Reform
in 1919.
[Vol. XIX:50
The Taxation of Ideology
Favorable rulings had to assume there was no direct and intentional po-
litical activity comprehended as part of the educational design. The un-
favorable holding cast its rule in the finding of a legislative purpose brood-
ing over the labor reform activity. Disallowing exempt status for political
activity of educational organizations probably represented an extension of
the limitation first placed in the business deduction provision of the tax laws
to prevent insidious influences upon the Congress.25  In formulating its anti-
politics rule, the Bureau had to purposefully ignore a majority rule established
in many states that a charitable trust purporting to educate the public re-
tained its character as such despite political ends or use of political means.
State Interpretations and the Massachusetts Minority
Litigation in state courts generally represented contests between heirs of the
deceased and the trustees of the "charitable" trust, the former seeking for
themselves the capital bequeathed with the latter seeking to perpetuate the
desires of the testator as expressed in his will. Charitable trusts avoid the
perpetuities problems and it was accepted that charitable trusts included the
species which were educational. 2 The minority rule against politics is best
exemplified by Jackson v. Phillips,27 where a Massachusetts court con-
sidered several "sentimental" trusts with one being found charitable and
one noncharitable. Under the will of Mr. Phillips, a trust to create public
sentiment against slavery and reform of the Fugitive Slave Law was deemed
charitable while another, aimed at equalizing the treatment of women, was
not a charity. The court justified the distinction on the ground that laws in-
volving slavery would change as a result of the newly created public senti-
ment and not through the trustees, while in the case of women's suffrage,
the trustees were expected to have a more proximate nexus with the political
processes. 28  Unless one blindly exalts form over substance, there is no
distinction between prompting legislation by awakening public sentiment
and prompting legislation by direct legislative contacts. The ultimate success
of either trust rested in part on lawfully sanctioning the equalities sought.
Obviously, both purposes needed favorable sentiment; otherwise, legislation
would never have been feasible. So dubious was the decision that only
25. See T.D. 2137, 17 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 48, 57-58 (1915); Regulations 33
(revised), Art. 143, T.D. 2690, 20 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 126, 197 (1918). See also
Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941); Harden Mortgage
Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 282 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 791 (1943);
Rugel v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1942).
26. See, e.g., Peth v. Spear, 63 Wash. 291, 115 P. 164 (1911).
27. 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867).
28. Id. at 571.
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Massachusetts held fast to the view. 29 What may have perpetuated one trust
over the other was the fact that, at the time, the status quo in Massachusetts
would not be affected by anti-slavery sentiment but would be if suffragettes
created sentiment in favor of equal treatment for women.s °
Other states found substantial reasons to sustain trusts for charitable
purposes where political means were contemplated or involved in accom-
plishing the purpose of the testator:
We are led to conclude that a trust for a public charity is not in-
valid merely because it contemplates the procuring of such changes
in existing laws as the donor deems beneficial to the people in gen-
eral, or to a class for whose benefit the trust is created. To hold
[otherwise] . . . would discourage improvement in legislation
and tend to compel us to continue indefinitely to live under laws
designed for an entirely different state of society. Such view
is opposed to every principle of our government based on the
theory that it is a government "of the people, by the people,
and for the people," and fails to recognize the right of those who
make the laws to change them at their pleasure, when circum-
stances may seem to require.
3 '
The inherent inconsistency of Jackson v. Phillips was shown by other
courts when they upheld trusts engaged in agitation for women's suffrage,
2
promotion of government efficiency and reform,
3 3 propagation of socialism,3 4
spreading the light on the single tax theory for land,3 5 prevention of racial
discrimination,3 6 and abolition of liquor traffic,3 7 to create, in effect, a major-
ity rule maintaining charitable trusts having a political flavor.
If we presume, consistent with authority, that organized groups seeking
to effect changes in law to bring medical, economic, and social justice,
are serving the needs of the community, as they see such needs,3 8 then such
29. Mr. Phillips' son and daughter continued their efforts to fund trusts for
women's suffrage, with only modest success. Bowditch v. Attorney Gen., 241 Mass. 168,
134 N.E. 796 (1922); Bacon v. Ransom, 139 Mass. 117, 29 N.E. 473 (1885).
30. See Bowditch v. Attorney Gen., 241 Mass. 168, 169, 134 N.E. 796, 798-99
(1922).
31. Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa. 194, 199-200, 116 A. 826, 827-28 (1922).
32. Garrison v. Little, 75 Ill. App. 402 (1892).
33. Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 266 P. 526 (1928); Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa.
194, 116 A. 826 (1922).
34. In re Cahan's Estate, 122 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sur. Ct. 1953); Peth v. Spear, 63
Wash. 291, 115 P. 164 (1911).
35. Broeker v. Ware, 27 Del. Ch. 8, 29 A.2d 591 (Ch. 1942); Ross v. Freeman, 21
Del. Ch. 44, 180 A. 527 (Ch. 1935); George v. Braddock, 45 N.J. Eq. 757, 18 A. 881
(Ct. Err. & App. 1889).
36. In re Lewis' Estate, 152 Pa. 477, 25 A. 878 (1893).
37. Haines v. Allen, 78 Ind. 100, 41 Am. R. 555 (1881); Buell v. Gardner, 83
Misc. 513, 144 N.Y.S. 945 (Sup. Ct. Eq. 1914); Harrington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485,
82 N.W. 345 (1900); Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1361 (1931).
38. See notes 32-37, supra; G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 378, 379 (2d ed.
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service, pursued lawfully though zealously and even against opposition, is
consistent with the classic definitions of charity.a9  Stimulating debate
and discussion, propagating new ideas, challenging static social and eco-
nomic concepts and pursuing their success over those in force or favor is an
integral part of the role of political parties. Because political parties tend
to stabilize society by providing channels for fruitful ideas, it would not be
unreasonable to characterize parties as public charities. Indeed, while
there is authority to the contrary,40 such a characterization would not repre-
sent a radical departure from traditional concepts of American charity.
Even in such an extreme case as the ideology of the Communist Party, there
is some inclination to permit the promotion of its concepts of democracy
under the mantle of charity or education. 41
Federal courts need not countenance state construction of words and
phrases when construing federal statutes.4 2  Even if a state opined that a
political party was a charity (for perpetuity purposes), it is extremely doubt-
ful a federal court would do likewise, unless construing a state statute.4 3 For
1964); IV SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 374.6 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS §
374 (1935).
39. It was Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867), which gave the
charity a broad reading including a "gift . . . for the benefit of an indefinite number
of persons . . . by relieving their bodies from . . . constraint." Id. at 556. Such con-
straint need not be physical but mental such as static social, economic or political doc-
trines. 14 C.J.S. Charities § 1 (1939). A charity does include "advancement of the
public good," id. § le, as well as the aid of governmental purposes, id. § 13.
40. See, e.g., In re Grossman's Estate, 75 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sur. Ct. 1947); In re Andre-
jevich's Estate, 57 N.Y.S.2d 86 (Sur. Ct. 1945); In re Deichelmann's Estate, 21 Pa.
D.&C.2d 659 (Montgomery County Ct. 1959); In re Boorse Trust, 64 Pa. D.&C.
447 (Montgomery County Ct. 1948). Cf. Workman's Circle Educ. Center, Inc. v.
Board of Assessors, 314 Mass. 616, 51 N.E.2d 313 (1943); In re Liapis Estate, 88
Pa. D.&C. 303 (Lawrence County Ct. 1954). The decisions, involving the So-
cialist Labor Party and affiliates, reflect the reluctance of courts to be sensitive to
ideals antagonistic to prevailing mores. Such antagonism evidences itself in the "rule
of law" that hostility to prevailing religion, law or morals is grounds for illegalizing a
charitable trust. See In re Mealy's Estate, 91 Cal. App. 2d 371, 204 P.2d 971 (1949);
10 AM. JUR. Charities § 67 (1937).
41. In re Mealy's Estate, 91 Cal. App. 2d 371, 204 P.2d 971 (1949), characterized
the publisher of the West Coast version of the Daily Worker, the Pacific Publishing
Foundation, Inc., as being of the same substance as nonprofit corporations. It is un-
derstood that the Foundation had been denied Section 101(6) status on May 19, 1943 by
the Bureau on the grounds of "substantial" legislative activity. See also In re Robbins,
21 Cal. Rptr. 797, 371 P.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1962) where a trust for the benefit of the
children of Smith Act "victims" was found to be charitable.
42. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). Under the present
regulations dealing with tax exempt organizations, the Commissioner seems to commit
himself to following decisions of a state court construing such terms as charitable, edu-
cational, and religious. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(5) (1959). State courts
tend to reject federal findings of charitable purpose made in the private rulings pro-
cedure. See, e.g., County of Douglas v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., 172 Neb. 696, 111
N.W.2d 719 (1961).
43. See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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a federal court, a charity may not be a charity when other people's money
is involved. That is, a government subsidy through tax exemption or donor
deductions is as significant a funding of the purpose as a direct contribution
and both involve a cost sharing by the entire tax paying populace.
4  It
may be this cost sharing factor which tended to cause federal courts to
be less sensitive than state courts to the causes of ardent persons. 4 5
Two considerations were involved in these federal tax controversies: first,
was the organization educational, either in its methodology or its ultimate
purpose; and second, was there involvement in political processes, either
actual or contemplated, sufficiently significant to declass the otherwise bona
fide claimant from the preferred status? As the ground rules developed,
the Government regularly modified its administrative regulations broaden-
ing the definition of education in an attempt to impart some sense out of
the ongoing conflict so that, in approximately 1934, the rulings policy of
the Bureau was liberalized in its traditional opposition to partisanship and
controversy. It was during this "liberal" period that many organizations,
later determined to be subversive, first qualified for exempt status.
The Jurisprudence of Education
From 1924 forward, the jurisprudence of education developed on a divergent
basis with the newly formed Board of Tax Appeals 46 taking negative po-
sitions and the Circuit Court of Appeals having a more benign attitude.
Whether the litigation over tax exemption and deductible contributions re-
sulted from adverse private rulings of the Bureau, or whether the organiza-
tions chose to ignore the rulings process, 47 is not clear from many opinions.
The early decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals tended to rest on the fail-
ure of counsel to produce adequate evidence on the purpose of the organiza-
44. Murray v. Comptroller, 241 Md. 383, 392, 216 A.2d 897, 906, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 816 (1966):
Indubitably, religious organizations benefit from the exception. Economically,
they are in the same position as though they paid taxes to the city and
state and then received back the amounts paid in the form of direct grants.
Moreover, members of the general public pay higher taxes than they would
if the exemptions were not in effect; the same amount of revenue must be
raised and, by reason of the exemption, the rate paid by non-exempt tax-
payers is higher.
45. For example, the state courts regularly found that propagating the principles of
Henry George was charitable (see note 35, supra) while the federal courts were not
convinced. Frederick C. Leubuscher, 21 B.T.A. 1022 (1930), modified, 54 F.2d 988
(2d Cir. 1932).
46. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336.
47. In its own inimitable style, the Board of Tax Appeals actively discouraged the
idea of obtaining rulings on exempt status by holding that such rulings were not
binding upon succeeding Commissioners. Agricultural Fair Ass'n, 40 B.T.A. 549
(1939); Stanford Univ. Bookstore, 29 B.T.A. 1280 (1934), a~f'd, 83 F.2d 710 (D.C.
Cir. 1936); James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
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tion. Thus, a contribution to the League to Enforce Peace was disallowed be-
cause the Board would not "take judicial notice of the nature of the organiza-
tion merely from the names of prominent individuals who sponsored it.''48
Such organizations as the North American Civic League for Immigrants, the
International Reform Bureau, the Scientific Temperance Federation and the
Massachusetts Anti-Saloon League were dismissed by the Board as entities
formed simply "to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda" and
were not educational. 49 The Reform Bureau was far more of an activist
than the others because it was intimately involved in the legislative and
campaign processes. The Anti-Saloon League had some legislative activity
and the Scientific Temperance Federation had no political activity whatso-
ever. The distinction, if any, between these organizations and the American
School Citizenship League, earlier found to be educational, 50 was that the
temperance and immigration groups had an admittedly predetermined point
of view which apparently colored their judgment. The Citizenship League,
on the other hand, while organized to promote, in part, "a responsible world
democracy and a real cooperation among nations" succeeded in promoting
the relatively noncontroversial concepts of "American citizenship."' '
The distinction between politics and education first emerged in a decision
involving the Civic Fund of the City Club of New York. There the Board
tended to preach a "principal purpose" test for education, indicating that
even if the methodology was educational, "advocacy of or opposition to
candidates and proposed municipal measures carries [the organization] be-
yond the exclusively educational purposes. '5 2 Informing the public, even
by fair presentation of pertinent facts on legislation or candidates, was de-
clared noneducational. Similarly, if the viewpoint of the organization on a
particular subject could be accomplished only by repealing or enacting legis-
lation, the organization failed to meet the "principal purpose" of being
48. Sophia G. Coxe, 5 B.T.A. 261, 263 (1926) (contribution deduction claimed
for 1919 under § 214(a)(11), Revenue Act of 1918). Cf. Ellen Nevins, 1 B.T.A.
1162 (1925) where contribution was disallowed for failure to prove that a "committee"
of the Knights of Columbus was a "corporation" within the meaning of § 214(a)(11),
Revenue Act of 1918. The League to Enforce Peace later qualified for charitable status
under a private ruling issued June 4, 1919. The ruling was cancelled October 17, 1921.
The World Peace Foundation, an organization which allied itself with the League's
principles, was found to be charitable in the midst of the Great War. Parkhurst v.
Burrill, 228 Mass. 196, 117 N.E. 39 (1917).
49. Herbert E. Fales, 9 B.T.A. 828, 832 (1927).
50. Rose D. Forbes, 7 B.T.A. 209, acquiesced in, VI-2 CUM. BULL. 3 (1927).
51. Id. 7 B.T.A. at 210.
52. Joseph M. Price, 12 B.T.A. 1186, 1189 (1928). See also Montgomery v. United
States, 63 Ct. Cl. 588 (1927), where the Court of Claims denied educational status to
the American Institute of Accountants, in part because its efforts to influence legisla-
tion "to safeguard the interests of public accountants" were "clearly incompatible with
the spirit and purpose of the exempting statute." Id. at 592.
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educational.58 The involvement of the pamphleteer in political processes
overrode any proper method utilized to alert or awaken the citizenry to the
problems which faced them.
The battle for status quo continued with the celebrated decision involving
the American Birth Control League.54 Margaret Sanger's husband made a
determined effort to qualify the organization as charitable, educational
and scientific by proving the worth of the works which the clinics were per-
forming in aiding mothers and potential mothers on the physiologic and
hygienic problems attendant in prolific procreation. The Board found birth
control to be pregnant with controversy and efforts aimed at enlightening
mothers and lawmakers on the political, social and economic considerations
were deemed "propaganda." Consistent with the earlier definition of propa-
ganda, we are thereby instructed that birth control accomplished "only the
purpose of the person . . . instigating it." 5 Obviously, planned parenthood
served only Margaret Sanger's purposes and did not "benefit the individual."
In its coup de grace, the Board also found that because some activities were
found to be illegal under Massachusetts law, the organization, by conducting
unlawful acts against the interests of the Commonwealth, was not exclusively
charitable or educational.
Prior to the affirmation of this decision by the Second Circuit, the Board
ruled on the status of such organizations as the League for Industrial De-
mocracy,56 Survey Associates,5 7 and the Pennsylvania League of Women
Voters. 58  The League for Industrial Democracy was interested in seeing
that public ownership of property prevailed. It sought to educate "a new
social order based on production for use and not for profit."' 9 Even though
the organization apparently proved it presented facts on both sides of various
issues, a seemingly proper method of education, the subject matter was
deemed "political." Manifesting its fear of new ideas, the Board observed:
In its campaign for this "new social order" the League advocated
drastic political and economic changes which are directly at odds
with existing economic theories and practices upon which society is
founded in this country and which pervade our system of Govern-
ment, and it is hardly to be presumed that Congress intended to fos-
ter such institutions by including them within the classification of
53. Joseph M. Price, 12 B.T.A. 1186 (1928).
54. J. Noah H. Slee, 15 B.T.A. 710 (1929), aff'd, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
55. S. 1362, 2 CUM. BULL 152, 154 (1920).
56. Bertha Poole Weyl, 18 B.T.A. 1092 (1930), rev'd 48 F.2d 811 (2d Cir.
1931).
57. Robert W. DeForest, 19 B.T.A. 595, acquiesced in IX-2 CUM. BULL. 15 (1930).
58. Charles W. Dahlinger, 20 B.T.A. 176 (1930), not acquiesced in, X-1 CUM.
BULL. 77, aff'd on other grounds, 51 F.2d 662 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 673
(1931).
59. Bertha Poole Weyl, 18 B.T.A. 1092 (1930).
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institutions which are encouraged as a matter of public policy
and as "aids of good government."' 0
The viewpoint precisely paralleled that of the Bureau:
[I]t was Congress' intention, when providing for the deduction of
contributions to educational corporations, not to benefit and assist
the aims of one class against another, not to encourage the dis-
semination of ideas in support of one doctrine as opposed to an-
other, to the profit of one class and to the detriment perhaps of
another, but to foster education in its true and broadest sense,
thereby advancing the interest of all, over the objection of none. 6'
The Survey and Survey Associates were journals in the field of education
and public health where, except for birth control, there was apparently little
objection or controversy, so they qualified as educational. In its effort to
chill the enthusiasm of activists using "education" as a cover, the Board
permitted this entity to make presentations on "controversial" matters so long
as it offered no solutions: "Usually the activities . . .are noncontroversial
in character, but when the subject under consideration may be liable to any
character of controversy, both sides of the question are presented, the object
being to present fairly all available facts with regard thereto . . . and without
an attempt to urge a particular solution of the problem. ' 62
It is hard to believe that journals founded by Jane Addams and con-
tinued by her disciples normally "failed to urge a particular solution" of
social problems within their interest. Shortly thereafter, a state affiliate of
the League of Women Voters was found to be educational since "it en-
deavors to present . . . facts for and against each issue, so that the women
may vote intelligently on these matters." Furthermore, "[i]t does not
attempt to aid any party or candidate. 63  The opinions in these cases
suggested a rule that to be a tax exempt educational organization, a group
must refrain from controversy, allay predetermined viewpoints, place all
available facts within the acuity of the audience, and, in sum, avoid offend-
ing the prevailing dogmas. Indeed, it was only the meek who inherited
the exemption.
Learned and Ardent Persons
At this juncture the various Courts of Appeals began their review of the
Board's decisions. The Second Circuit, in Slee v. Commissioner,64 upheld the
Board in denying a charitable contribution to the Birth Control League. Ap-
60. Id. at 1094.
61. S. 1362, 2 CuM. BULL. 152, 154 (1920).
62. Robert W. DeForest, 19 B.T.A. 595, 598 (1930).
63. Charles W. Dahlinger, 20 B.T.A. 176, 177 (1930).
64. 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
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parently reading a close parallel to the business deduction denial, Learned
Hand wrote that the federal fisc must not finance agitation. 5 His opinion is
the keystone of the traditional nonsubvention pose of Treasury where the ends
of any group are to be achieved through legislation. His secondary proposi-
tion, that when ardent persons organize to secure a more general acceptance
of their beliefs, their campaign in proper context is not educational or char-
itable, is suspect. He seemed to contradict outstanding rulings of the Bureau
during the depression period which recognized ardent, albeit noncontroversial,
causes as exemptable.6 6  Political action, like dialectics, does not serve its
own purpose; rather, it is no more than a means to an end. The Birth Control
League, which sought to promote hygiene, marital privacy and an under-
standing of the gravity of overpopulation was stymied by interdicting legisla-
tion. Removal of the legislative barrier did not or would not secure the cause;
65. This raises the only question which seems to us important, which is,
whether the League is also agitating for the repeal of laws preventing birth
control. . . . Political agitation as such is outside the statute, however inno-
cent the aim, though it adds nothing to dub it "propaganda," a polemical
word used to decry the publicity of the other side. Controversies of that
sort must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside
from them ...
So far as the society at bar sought to relieve itself of the restraints of law
in order the better to conduct its charity, we might indeed hold that it fell with-
in the [exemption]. So far, however, as its political activities were general,
it seems to us, regardless of how much we might be in sympathy with them,
that its purposes cannot be said to be "exclusively" charitable, educational or
scientific. . . . [Wihen people organize to secure the more general accept-
ance of beliefs which they think beneficial to the community at large, it is
common enough to say that the public must be "educated" to their views ...
[B]ut it would be a perversion to stretch the meaning of the statute to such
cases; they are indistinguishable from societies to promote or defeat prohibi-
tion, to adhere to the League of Nations, to increase the Navy. or any other
of the many causes in which ardent persons engage.
Id. at 185. (Emphasis added).
66. If persons organize to awaken "public sentiment" on the need to rehabilitate
convicts, I.T. 2088, 111-2 CuM. BULL. 220 (1924), or to secure and enforce game con-
servation laws, I.T. 2546, IX-2 CUM. BULL. 122 (1930), they are exempt. Compare
I.T. 2267, V-1 CuM. BULL. 84 (1926), modified, G.C.M. 11705, XII-I CuM. BULL. 57
(1933) allowing exemption to organizations which encourage youths to join military
service camps. One encouraging note was that the American Committee for the Out-
lawry of War qualified as "charitable" in a private ruling on September 25, 1926.
Gun lovers such as the National Rifle Association, who wished to "foster an inter-
est" in the use of firearms were deemed educators, G.C.M. 443, V-2 CuM. BULL. 66
(1926). Cf. Hazen v. National Rifle Ass'n, 101 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1938); National
Rifle Ass'n v. Young, 134 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1943); G.C.M. 24100, 1944 CUM.
BULL. 192 unclassing NRA as educational, but holding it a "social welfare" group. The
most interesting aspect is that the Bureau itself evidently rejected Hand's formulation
when it held that the American Birth Control League and the Birth Control League of
Massachusetts were charitable and educational in private rulings of March 2, 1938 and
March 4, 1938, after a showing that they had abandoned legislative work or overtures.
See, e.g., Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987, 990 n.2 (1st Cir. 1940).
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it would merely permit the process of education to continue in a less hostile
environment.
Evidently buoyed by the Slee affirmation, the Board continued to stifle
deductible dissent, but with decidedly less anti-intellectual overtones. The
Robert Schalkenbach Foundation and the Manhattan Single Tax Club were
found to have no educational purpose in their methods of propagating the
ideas of Henry George.67 In his 1876 book Progress and Poverty, Mr.
George quite candidly argued for a totally new approach to the tax structures
of America to overcome social and economic maladies then plaguing the
post Civil War period. His program called for repeal of existing tax laws
and their replacement by a single tax on the increment of rising land values.
The Foundation was committed to "teach and propagate" this doctrine of a
single tax while the Club was to "advocate" it. In fairly moderate tones, the
Board recognized that the degree of controversy inherent in any doctrine
was not a proper criterion for determining educational status; the "power to
engage in legislative and other noneducational operations," however, suffices
to deprive the contributor his deduction.68
Curiously enough, this case seemed to represent a turning point for both the
Bureau and the courts. After Slee, panels of the Second Circuit seemed
allergic to the Hand formulation of educational purpose and reversed the
Board as to the status of the League for Industrial Democracy and the Schal-
kenbach Foundation. 69 The thesis was that if the material disseminated
was "of interest and information to students of political subjects and political
economy," that was all that education demanded. 70 Education is the proc-
ess not only of instruction but of the full development of the intellect by
any normal methodology. Regardless of the definite "social doctrine" es-
poused by the group, if its propagation enlivens the human experience, it is
educational. Thus, "[t]he fact that its aim may or may not resemble that
of a political party does not of itself remove it from the category of an asso-
ciation engaged in educational work."' 71 So long as no legislative program
"hovers" over the activities, and presumably in a nonelection year, no cam-
paign activity, dissemination of opinion even reflecting a predetermined
67. Frederic C. Leubuscher, 21 B.T.A. 1022 (1930), modified, 54 F.2d 998 (2d
Cir. 1932).
68. Id. 21 B.T.A. at 1030.
69. Weyl v. Commissioner, 48 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1931) (League for Industrial
Democracy); Leubuscher v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1932) (Robert
Schalkenbach Foundation). In a private ruling of May 2, 1940, the Bureau, evi-
dently in response to the Leubuscher case, held exempt as educational the Public Own-
ership League of America whose ideology (and lack of activism) apparently paralleled
that of the League for Industrial Democracy.
70. Weyl v. Commissioner, 48 F.2d 811, 812 (2d Cir. 1931).
71. Id.
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point of view would not unclass the organization. Should any gathering
seek to "teach, expound and propagate" a social, economic or political philos-
ophy through debates, lectures and discussions, it will be classed as edu-
cational and entitled to exemption. It would seem, then, even if the ultimate
purpose of the organization could only be secured by legislation, that an
educational classification would be available for a proper methodology,
presuming no significant intrusion of actual political activity. Following
this thesis, an affiliate of the American Birth Control League was found to
be educational along with the World League Against Alcoholism by several
circuits, overturning Board decisions to the contrary.7 2 Where religious prem-
ises were introduced, there was even greater latitude permitted in the
extent to which the zealots could maneuver in the political arena.78  Per-
mitting religious boards to so intrude was regarded by one jurist, however,
as placing God on the side of the heaviest moneybags. 74
On the other hand, where political contacts and influence were prevalent
in the actions of members and officers who were attempting to secure their
reforms through political campaigns or legislation, the Board was upheld.75
While there prevailed among the circuits a distinct lack of consistency in the
degree of actual or contemplated political activity needed to overturn an
educational association, appellants tended on the whole to be more success-
ful before the circuits than the Board of Tax Appeals. 76  Congress seemed
72. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 875, rev'd, 112 F.2d 987 (1st
Cir. 1940); Cochran v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1115 (1934), rev'd, 78 F.2d 176
(4th Cir. 1935).
73. Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 157 (1940), rev'd, 122 F.2d 108
(3d Cir. 1941).
74. Id. 122 F.2d at 114 (Clark, J., dissenting). Cf. Letter from Colin Stam, Chief of
Staff, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation to Harry S. Byrd, Chairman,
Senate Finance Committee, 110 CONG. REC. 5078 (1964) (legislative activity of the
National Council of Churches during the pendency of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
Where the zealot was an atheist or humanist, the benign attitude wilted. See, e.g.,
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Welch, 25 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1938), denying estate tax
deduction for bequest to Freethinkers of America.
75. The National Women's Party was denied favored status in Vanderbilt v. Com-
missioner, 34 B.T.A. 1033 (1936), aff'd, 93 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1937). In later years,
the National Women's Party had evidently forsaken politics to such a degree that a
state court found it to be a charitable organization under the Maryland inheritance tax
law. Register of Wills v. Cook, 241 Md. 264, 216 A.2d 542 (1966).
76. The Board continued to deny deductions (or exempt status, where applicable)
where there was any connection with political activity. Henriette T. Noyes, 31 B.T.A.
121 (1934) (contribution to National League of Women Voters); Alfred A. Cook, 30
B.T.A. 292 (1934) (contribution to Association of the Bar of the City of New York);
James J. Forstall, 29 B.T.A. 428 (1933) (contribution to League of Nations Association
of Illinois, Inc.); John H. Watson, Jr., 27 B.T.A. 463 (1932) (contribution to Citizens
League of Cleveland). Of the cited entries, only the League of Nations Association and
its state affiliates later managed to purify themselves to qualify for a favorable Section
101 (6) status in a private Bureau ruling of October 22, 1941.
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unsatisfied by the anomalous results and tried its hand at settling the con-
troversies when the Bureau's ruling process became too liberal.
Private Rulings and Political Legislation
In 1934, the tax laws were amended to limit legislative activity of char-
itable and educational organizations.17  Unrequested by the Treasury De-
partment, the Senate Finance Committee appended the provision to the
Revenue Act of 1934 without making any statement in its report as to the
needs or purpose of the limitation. As the amendment was originally drafted,
it would have denied exemption for participation in partisan politics or sub-
stantial legislative activities.78  When the tax bill reached the Senate floor
for debate, it appeared that the sponsor of the amendment, Senator Reed,
was seeking to curb a maverick organization known as the National Econ-
omy League. This particular organization had just begun enjoying the fruits
of tax exemption and deductible contributions by the issuance, on November
2, 1933, of a favorable private ruling under Section 103(6) of the Revenue
Act of 1932.
The debates indicated that Senator Reed, ranking minority member of
the Finance Committee, wanted the Committee staff to draw an amendment
which would only unclass the National Economy League and not the Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, both of which engaged in legis-
lative activity. He stated that the Committee did not wish to affect "any of
the worthy institutions." '79 It was his view, "[t]here is no reason in the world
why a contribution made to the National Economy League should be deduct-
ible . . . . I do not reproach the draftsmen [for being all inclusive] . . but
this amendment goes much further than the committee intended to go."
8 0
Senator LaFollette wanted to do away with the tax provisions which granted
privileges to charitable and educational organizations. He chastised his
colleagues for presuming that the Internal Revenue Bureau could ascertain
or differentiate between education and propaganda: "It is my judgment that
we never shall get away from mistakes of administration and from decisions
which may seem like favoritism until all contributions to organizations of
this kind are made subject to the income tax.""' The amendment was passed
77. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 23(o)(2), 101(6), 406, and 517, 48 Stat.
680, 690, 700, 755, 760.
78. 78 CONG. REC. 5861, 7831 (1934).
79. Id. at 5861.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 5959.
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by the Senate and, after modification by the joint House-Senate conference on
the bill, became law.
s2
In the overview, the antipolitics amendment served only to introduce addi-
tional confusion as to what constituted an "educational" or "charitable"
purpose. Almost without exception, organizations hustling for their causes or
cures found themselves continuously accused of ultimate legislative intentions
and denied exemption or deductions based upon the 1934 limitation a Al-
though Congress' thrust seemed aimed at actual, not proposed, activity
which was substantial in nature, the limitation was apparently extended by
the Bureau in its private rulings process to limit status where the ultimate
goal of the group could be realized only through legislation.
84
The legislation proscription has really only been successfully invoked
against the League of Women Voters85 and associations of doctors. 86  The
lack of any published ground rules, in fact the refusal even to acknowledge
whether or not the standard is quantitative or qualitative or both, has sub-
stantially eroded any confidence which the courts might have in applying the
clause to an activist organization.8 7 Indeed, it is not entirely free from doubt
that the political limitation is constitutional in its obvious chilling of the rights
82. On July 25, 1934, less than three months after the effective date of the Revenue
Act of 1934, the private ruling letter to the League was cancelled.
83. See Note, The Revenue Code and a Charity's Politics, 73 YALE L.J. 661 (1964)
discussing treatment of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. There, the Internal Revenue
Service held that since peace could only be obtained by influencing legislation, exempt
status should be revoked. The exempt status was later restored. Because organiza-
tions do not lose their income tax exemption under Section 501(a), INT. RE'.. CODE
of 1954 for legislative activity, merely shifting over to the social welfare classification,
none of the cases decided on the legislation clause were suits for refunds for income
taxes. The litigation included challenges as to deductions for income taxes, estate
taxes, gift taxes, and social security taxes. See, e.g., Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227
F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955) (contributions); Martha H. Davis, 22 T.C. 1091 (1954) (gift
taxes); Luther Ely Smith, 3 T.C. 696 (1944) (contributions); Estate of Sharpe, 3 T.C.
612 (1944) (estate taxes); Bureau of Jewish Employment Problems v. United States
(D. Ill. Oct. 5, 1954) (unemployment taxes).
84. The 1959 regulations to be used for 1954 Code years discuss the clause in terms
of the concept of "action organizations." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (1959).
No attempt is made to mediate the problem of "substantial part," what are the "ac-
tivities," the effect of the term propaganda, etc. See Clark, The Limitation on Political
Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REV. 439, 451 (1960).
85. E.g., Kuper v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1964); League of Women
Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960); cf. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Ky. 1954). Contra, Luther Ely Smith, 3
T.C. 696 (1944). For preclause years, see Charles W. Dahlinger, 20 B.T.A. 176
(1930) and Florence G. Withey, No. 62939 (B.T.A., Jan. 20, 1933).
86. E.g., Hammerstein v. Kelley, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1965); Krohn v. United
States, 246 F. Supp. 341 (D. Colo. 1965).
87. For suggested distinctions of the quantum approach, see REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMM. TO INVESTIGATE TAx-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND COMPARABLE ORGANIZATIONS,
H.R. REP. No. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 95-96 (1954).
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which organizations have to petition the Congress for redress of group
grievances.""
Communism and Tax Exemption
Many organizations later charged with subversive tendencies moved through
the private rulings process to secure a letter from the Deputy Commissioner,
or other official, to the effect that the organization qualified for tax exemption.
Government records indicate the first communist ideologue to qualify, the
American Society for Cultural Relations with Russia, Inc., was granted a
favorable ruling on February 5, 1930, under Section 103(6) of the Revenue
Act of 1928. The exact nature of the entity at that time is not known since
its public information file has been destroyed.8 9
The propriety of tax exemption for subversives first surfaced in remarks
by Martin Dies, the then Chairman of the Special Committee on Un-American
Activities in 1942.90 In seeking to rebut challenges to the usefulness of his
committee, Dies cited an "Attorney General's List" which named twelve or-
ganizations which he alleged had been branded "Communist controlled."
Several of these organizations had already qualified for exemption in private
rulings and others would do so shortly. 91 As part of his attack, Congressman
Dies charged that the Robert Marshall Foundation, a New York corporation,
was the principal financial supporter of these groups.92  The Foundation rep-
resented the incorporation of several trusts which the late Robert Marshall
88. See National Council on Facts of Overpopulation v. Caplin, 224 F. Supp. 313
(D.D.C. 1963). See also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959). In Cam-
marano, the Supreme Court observed the parallel of the Section 162 regulations which
denied a business expense deduction for lobbying and the statutory limitation imposed
upon charities, and the deductibility of contributions to them. The premise for fault-
ing the challenge to the constitutionality of the Section 162 regulations was that "every-
one in the community should stand on the same footing [deduction-wise]," id. at 513.
That premise is obsolete since 1962 (see Section 162(e)), so there may yet be a suc-
cessful constitutional argument against denying educational and charitable institutions
the same rights of deduction for lobbying now enjoyed by business.
89. Under the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 75(a),
72 Stat. 1606, 1660 applications of organizations which at any time qualified for
tax exemption as an organization described in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 501(c)(1)
to (17), or predecessor sections, are available for viewing by the public in Washington,
D.C. See Lehrfeld & Webster, Administration by the IRS of Non-Profit Organization
Tax Matters, 21 TAx LAw. 591, 610-12 (1967); Treas. Reg. § 301.6104-1(a) (1958).
90. 88 CONG. REC. 7441-58 (1942).
91. Among the organizations alleged to be subversive by Chairman Dies were
the American League Against War and Fascism (a/k/a American League for Peace
and Democracy), American Youth Congress, and the League of American Writers, each
of which had qualified for tax exempt status prior to Sept. 24, 1942. See Appendix
pp. 72-73 infra. The National Negro Congress qualified after the Dies denunciation, on
June 18, 1943, as did the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties in a private
ruling on Jan. 21, 1944 as a social welfare organization.
92. 88 CONG. REC. 7449-52 (1942).
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had established by his will to carry on economic research ("production for
use and not for profit") and civil liberties activities. Due to a peculiarity of
the estate tax deduction laws, the 1939 Code could not be used to counter
specifically the purported legislative activites of the trusts where the executors
claimed a charitable deduction. 93 The Government fell back upon the Slee
formulation against political agitation which the Tax Court and the Second
Circuit upheld. 94 One can read the opinions of the courts without detecting
whatsoever any argument by the Government as to denial of the estate tax
deduction on portentous un-Americanism. Despite the charges of subversive
activity and financing of alleged Communist affiliates, the Bureau issued a
favorable private ruling to the Foundation during the pendency of the liti-
gation, holding that the Foundation qualified as a social welfare organization,
but was not eligible for deductible contributions. In 1948, the private ruling
was summarily revoked.
It is noteworthy that after the enactment of the legislation clause in 1934,
"educational" organizations with but one exception did not have their status
challenged except upon that provision. This may be attributable to the fact
that the liberal rulings policy of the Government simply permitted ideologues
to qualify if they were not politically active or ardent persons and their causes
had lost their ardor for combat.95  The exception involved the prospect
of validating the subversive test for declassing an organization. The Founda-
tion for World Government was formed during the Truman era to conduct a
vast public educational campaign in the principles of "world government."
The Commissioner disallowed the donor of one million dollars a gift tax de-
duction. In a decision not reviewed by the entire Tax Court, 96 Judge Raum
93. Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 812(d), 53 Stat. 124-25, be-
quests to religious or charitable corporations were tax exempt provided that the or-
ganizations did not carry on substantial propaganda or lobbying activities. How-
ever, bequests to trustees were not subject to this provision, an omission rectified by the
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 409, 56 Stat. 949-50.
94. Estate of Marshall v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1048 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 75
(2d Cir. 1945). Three months later, the Second Circuit allowed the social welfare
exemption for a radio station, WEVD, organized to promote the "dissemination of
liberal and progressive social views" related obviously to socialism, notwithstanding the
station sold commercial advertising time. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 3 T.C. 949 (1944), rev'd, 148 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1945).
95. The liberalization of the private ruling standards was evidenced by an amend-
ment to the "educational" regulations published in Regulations 101 (applicable to the
Revenue Act of 1938), dated February 8, 1939 as part of Section 101(6)-i:
[Tihe publication of books and the giving of lectures advocating a cause of a
controversial nature shall not of itself be sufficient to deny an organization
the exemption, if carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influ-
ence legislation form no substantial part of its activities, its principal purpose
and substantially all of its activities being clearly of a nonpartisan, noncon-
troversial and educational nature.
96. Estate of Anita McCormick Blaine, 22 T.C. 1195 (1954).
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found that while, on the surface, the grants, studies, lectures, research pro-
gram, and publications were educational, it was all for the attainment of a
political objective. No evidence was presented that there was any direct cam-
paign activity or actual "attempts to influence legislation." Relying upon
Slee, the Judge found that though the methodology was apparently proper,
striving for such an objective was not furthering an educational purpose. 97
The Government also argued there were "subversive" characters receiving
grants which tainted the Foundation. The court resisted the opportunity to
divine the subversity of the recipients of grants although it did permit the in-
troduction of "some evidence" over the "vigorous objection" of the Foun-
dation.9
8
The Attorney General's List
In 1947, to counter accusations of softness against communism directed to-
ward his administration by Parnell Thomas and his Un-American Activities
Committee,"9 President Truman issued a sweeping executive order designed
to sanitize Washington. 100 Through the vehicle of a Department of Justice
investigation, organizations would be designated as totalitarian, fascist, sub-
versive, etc., and affiliation with such groups would represent grounds for
dismissal from government service. The first list, as prepared by the Justice
Department, was made public March 20, 1948.101 Before then, however,
the list obviously had been circulating through government since summary
revocations of exempt status had been begun as early as February 27,
1947, for tax exempt organizations listed thereon. As additions were later
made to the Attorney General's List, revocations were processed. 102 In a
news release of February 4, 1948, Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Schoeneman observed simply: "The tax laws do not contemplate and it has
never been our policy to grant tax exemption or other tax privileges to sub-
versive organizations.' '108 The Commissioner did not elaborate on the term
97. Id. at 1213. Organizations having similar goals, but more sublime in their
statement of purposes had earlier qualified for charitable and educational status by
private rulings. For example, Federal Union qualified under Section 101(6) on Au-
gust 12, 1943, and the Union for Democratic Action first qualified under Section
101(8) on May 22, 1942 and its "educational fund" qualified under Section 101(6)
on February 4, 1944.
98. The Foundation, denied tax-exempt status in a private ruling of Aug. 27, 1951
under Section 101(6), later received a favorable ruling under Section 101(8) in a
letter of December 12, 1952. This ruling, despite the allegations of subversity, was never
disturbed.
99. See W. GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE 194-95 (1968); E. LATHAM, THE COM-
MUNIST CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON 362-68 (1966).
100. Exec. Order No. 9,835, 3 C.F.R. § 129 (Supp. 1947).
101. 13 Fed. Reg. 1471 (1948).
102. See Appendix, pp. 72-73 infra.
103. 1948 CCH Income Tax Serv. 6075. In Joseph Morgenstern, 14 CCH Tax Ct.
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"subversive" for purposes of the tax code. The Government issued no pub-
lished ruling or regulation formally grafting this interpretation of the Code to
the administration procedures for private ruling.
None of the organizations listed in the Appendix challenged their loss of
tax status. Their privacy may have been more important than all the tax
considerations combined.104  Donors were not enchanted with the idea of
publicly identifying themselves with these subversive organizations. 10 5 As
a consequence, there has been no true test of the federal administrative
position.
Congressional Action
Even while purgation of the tax rolls continued administratively, Congress
stepped into specify in what fashion communist controlled and affiliated or-
ganizations were to be stripped of their tax privileges. As one aspect of the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,106 Congress provided that an or-
ganization under a final order to register with the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board as a communist group is not entitled to tax exemption or eligible
to receive deductible contributions. 0 7  The statute did not operate retro-
actively. Although there are final orders outstanding against certain com-
munist groups,' 08 but not the Communist Party,' 09 neither the Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Board nor the Internal Revenue Service has ever promulgated
Mem. 282 (1955) the status of the organizations involved was questioned when the de-
ductibility of contributions to it were denied for 1946-48. The Tax Court opinion of
Judge Opper makes no mention of the organization's listing on the Attorney General's
List. Contributions evidently were allowed for the years in dispute.
104. Several "suspect" organizations did litigate aspects of the tax consequences in-
herent in soliciting money for their causes, but they were never exempt and did not
claim to be before the Tax Court. See, e.g., National Comm. to Secure Justice in the
Rosenberg Case, 27 T.C. 837 (1957); Bail Fund of the Civil Rights Congress of New
York, 26 T.C. 482 (1956).
105. The Government recognized early the benefits accorded the administrators of
the tax laws in their statutory permission to obtain financial data. In 1950, Congress-
man Buchanan sought information on the finances of the Civil Rights Congress, a
listed entity representing the merger of at least one previously exempt organization, and
its executive secretary refused to produce data on contributors. See Hearings Before
the House Select Comm. on Lobbying Activities, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. Part 9 (1950).
His refusal to provide data triggered a contempt action which was overturned, United
States v. Patterson, 206 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1953). In later tax-centered proceedings,
the Government similarly failed. In re Patterson, 125 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1954),
rev'd sub nom., United States v. Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955).
106. Ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987.
107. Id. at 996-97, § 1l(a),(b), 50 U.S.C. § 790 (1964). See Communist Party
of the United States v. SACB, 223 F.2d 531, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
108. See generally 1968 SACB ANN. REP. 11.
109. Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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rulings or regulations to deal with such orders. The Board apparently hopes
the Internal Revenue Service regularly reads the Federal Register. 110
As part of its 1951 search for parties responsible for the failure of the
United States China policy,"' a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee undertook an investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).
The hearings began July 25, 1951 and lasted until June 20, 1952. A report
was issued, 1 2 which claimed that the IPR was an instrument of com-
munist propaganda and military intelligence. In reaching this conclusion
the subcommittee had the Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service
do a study of the ideologies which pervaded the IPR's publications, Far
Eastern Survey and Pacific Affairs. Almost three years later, on May 25,
1955, IPR's tax exempt status was revoked retroactively. The grounds,
according to the revocation letter, was that IPR was engaged in the dis-
semination of controversial and partisan propaganda. No finding of sub-
versiveness was apparently made by the Internal Revenue Service. Five years
later, a federal district court held that the IPR was exempt.'
1
From 1952 to 1954, Congress, in a more determined fashion, inter-
mittently investigated foundations to measure the subversiveness or propa-
ganda elements inherent in these financiers of the intellectual community.
In 1952 hearings, Bureau officials simply stated that it was the "practice" to
deny subversive organizations tax exempt status." 4 In later hearings in
1954, representatives of the Internal Revenue Service were asked to focus
on "political propaganda and Un-American Activity as factors affecting
exemption under the income tax laws."'1 At the time of the testimony of the
Assistant Commissioner, it was apparent that the Revenue Service did not
rely primarily on Section 11(b) of the Internal Security Act as grounds for
110. According to the Board's General Counsel, "The Board is required by law to
publish in the Federal Register an appropriate notice as to each order of the Board
which becomes final. It is our understanding that the Internal Revenue Service uses
such notice in connection with Section 11 (b). The Service also contacts us periodically
as a check." Letter from Frank R. Hunter, Jr. to Catholic University Law Review,
Nov. 29, 1968.
111. E. LATHAM, THE COMMUNIST CONTROVERSY IN WASHINGTON 296-316 (1966).
112. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, S. REP.
2050, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
113. Institute of Pacific Relations v. United States, 5 Ann. Fed. Tax R.2d 1333
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
114. Hearings Before the House Select Comm. to Investigate Tax Exempt Founda-
tions and Comparable Organizations, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1952). Testimony of Nor-
man Sugarman, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue. See also H.R.
REP. No. 2514, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
115. Hearings Before the House Special Comm. to Investigate Tax Exempt Founda-
tions and Comparable Organizations, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 429 (1954). For a reprint of
the Assistant Commissioner's testimony at this time see 32 TAXEs 533 (1954).
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revoking or denying tax exempt status. Instead, it clung to its administrative
judgments:
The term "un-American" does not appear as such, in the tax laws
or regulations. I have no hesitancy in stating, however, that it is
the firm policy of the Revenue Service to deny exemption to any
organization which evidence demonstrates is subversive.
The determination of the Revenue Service denying exemption
must, however, be based on lack of qualification under the terms
of the tax law, namely failure to qualify as an organization or-
ganized and operated exclusively for educational purposes. It is
our belief that an organization which is truly subversive cannot be
considered as exclusively educational.
There are no organizations [on the Attorney General's List] which
are also on our list of exempt organizations.
In addition, statutory restriction on exemption is imposed by section
1 (b) of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
Thus far no organizations have been reported to us by the Depart-
ment of Justice as registered under the Internal Security Act. I
understand the Department of Justice is engaged in seeking to re-
quire registration of certain organizations. There has been no appli-
cation of this act to any organization currently exempt under the
tax laws.
Accordingly, under the laws administered by the Internal Revenue
Service, determinations are not made as to whether an organiza-
tion is un-American. It is sufficient for denial of exemption if
it is determined that the organization does not meet the present
statutory tests. 110
The Committee's report makes no contribution whatsoever to proper analysis
of the legislative and constitutional implications in relating findings of sub-
versiveness and tax benefits. 117 As indicated by the dissenting minority
members of the Special Committee, it would have been better had no report
issued at all." 8
Less than one month after this testimony, Senator McCarran sought to
legislate around the final order provision of Section 11 (b) to deny exemption
in the fashion earlier adopted by the administrators. His attempted amend-
ment to the then pending Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would have made
mere listing on the Attorney General's List grounds for loss of tax privi-
leges.1 19 Additionally, if a tax exempt group was found to have made a
116. Hearings, supra note 118, at 434.
117. H.R. REP. No. 2681, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
118. Id. at 421.
119. 100 CONG. REC. 9038-39 (1954).
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donation to a "subversive organization or to any subversive individual,"
the organization would lose its exemption and eligibility for deductible con-
tributions. Although adopted by the Senate, the provision was deleted in the
House-Senate conference. 120  Perhaps as a sop to the Senator, the staff of
the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation was instructed to research




Except for a brief resurrection of the problem in 1964 relating to labor
organizations, 122 communism and federal tax exemption were relatively dor-
mant until the Communist Party began its own anabasis with the Commis-
sioner. The Internal Revenue Service began its audit of the books and records
of the Communist Party on March 23, 1954.123 As I have tried to demon-
strate, the general consensus of the courts and the private rulings process was
to permit some political activity by associations claiming a federal tax ex-
emption so long as such activity was not significant in relation to its proper
purposes. Ideologues who were "subversive" according to unilateral judg-
ments were summarily disqualified from tax exemption and the practice has
never been challenged. Despite legislation which apparently usurps adminis-
tratively imposed judgments on disqualifying subversive organizations from
tax exemption, no one could say with certainty what positive elements in-
hered in such judgments, even presuming their validity. As the record stood
in 1954, neither the Party nor the revenue agent could possibly agree on the
Party's qualifications, or lack thereof, for an income tax exemption. And as
shall be later observed, after thirteen years of litigation, no one is any better
informed. 12
4
120. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1954).
121. Letter from Laurence Woodworth, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation, Aug. 7, 1967, on file with Catholic University Law Review.
122. SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEAMSTERS UNION AND MINE, MILL AND SMELTER WORKERS,
USE OF TAX EXEMPT FUNDS FOR SUBVERSIVE PURPOSES, UNNUMBERED REP., 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
123. Brief for Respondent at 3, Communist Party v. Commissioner, No. 63763,
(T.C., Aug. 14, 1956).
124. The litigation between the Communist Party and the Commissioner will be
created in a subsequent issue of this Law Review.
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